Introduction
The dominant view is that the 'Great War' represented for France the end of an economic and social era that is often considered with nostalgia in France and with condescension abroad.
1 In this view, not only the belle époque but the entire nineteenth century is considered to be an era in which economic liberalism was counterbalanced by a strong state which guaranteed the 'equilibrium' of a well-balanced economy of 'moderate' industrialisation. This is symbolised by the image of its 'three pillars' -agriculture, manufacturing, and services -being of similar size, or by a similar balance between the urban and rural areas. Another view, mostly developed by economic historians, highlights the rapid changes in the French economy and society before the war. Dynamic industrial change was underway, best symbolised by the automobile and aircraft industries. Complex firms, whose mere size contradicts the view of 'garden-like France', were developing rapidly in manufacturing and financial services. Social change and workers' movements were important and relatively well integrated in increasingly democratic politics. This view, when comparing the belle époque with the 1920s, leads to an emphasis on the continuity that dominated in terms of technology and organisation at the firm level and even in the private economy as a whole. But it was not sufficient to modify the dominant view, maybe because the war introduced new economic phenomena and policies, gave to the state a much increased role in macroeconomic management, and started a long period of economic and international instability. In sum, it was as much a watershed for France as the Great Depression has been termed for the United States (Obstfeld and Taylor, 1998) .
Surprisingly, the economic history of the Great War has not been much used to discriminate between these views, in spite of the fact that France's ability to resist industrial Germany's attack was a powerful test of the strength of its economy. The fact that, because of the invasion, changing boundaries, and a massive mobilisation in the statistical administration, economic statistics -mostly budgetary ones -deteriorated during the war, does not help in studying the continuities between the pre-and postwar periods. The situation is even more difficult for the direct study of the war economy itself. This chapter uses the data recently produced by Villa (1997) on the whole twentieth century to present a synthetic view of the economic dimensions of the war, and tries to shed more light on that most difficult question of the degree of discontinuity that the war introduced in various aspects of the economy. In doing so, the chapter also highlights some problems with this data set and suggests some further research on this under-studied subject.
The second section describes quantitatively the various shocks that the war imposed on the economy. The third section considers the macroeconomic impact of war-related economic policies, mostly war finance and foreign relations. The fourth section presents in more detail the changes in the state's intervention in the economy that were favoured by the war, and tries to evaluate the capacity of the economy to accommodate the shocks that it suffered. The fifth section provides some concluding remarks on the consequences of the war for economic growth and the structure of the French economy.
The War as a shock
If the war did not come as a surprise, its development and duration were unanticipated. The government had planned for war: army mobilisation, stocks of guns and ammunitions as well as the logistics and other requirements of a modern army had been well organised, but no long-term industrial mobilisation had been prepared, even in the 1912 Plan de mobilisation. Some economic measures were taken in order to limit the impact of the war's beginning, such as a special credit from the Banque de France to the Treasury, or stocks of notes distributed to the banks. A rapid intervention blocked a stock market crash and a bank run. 3 Nevertheless, the war represented an enormous shock to the economy.
Contrary to the British and especially the US economies, which benefited from increased demand and suffered less drain on their resources, table 6.1 shows that the war exacted a high cost from the French economy, at a pace which paralleled the evolution of the military situation. GDP decreased sharply in the first year of the conflict, probably because of the first impact of the shocks described below. It then stabilised at a slightly higher level in 1916-17, suggesting a new equilibrium had been reached. With a further fall in 1918, French GDP fell to a trough more than 30 per cent below its 1913 level.
Three shocks affected the economy and were responsible for this depression: (1) the invasion and the following occupation of north-eastern 
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Sources and notes: Nominal and real GDP and its components (items 1 to 6) in the 1981 French system of national accounts, plus various products in physical units. Industrial production is the sum of items 2a to 2f. Column 1 gives data in billions of francs (for GDP and its components) or in physical units. Subsequent columns give index numbers for 1914 to 1920 based on 1913, covering the entire French post-war territory. All data from Villa (1997) and our calculations.
France; (2) the mobilisation of labour and financial resources for the war; (3) the massive shift in demand and supply resulting from the enormous increase in government spending and from the changes in foreign trade imposed by the war. These shocks will be discussed here in terms of their direct effects on the markets for labour, capital, and goods, before the consequences for production are considered. The macroeconomic policy dimension will be considered in the following section.
The invasion as an economic shock
With Belgium, and later Italy, France was the western country most directly affected by the war, since it was fought in France and part of the territory was occupied. The invasion affected all dimensions of the economy: the production and supply of various goods, government resources, capital availability for investment, transportation networks, etc. Since the invasion began shortly after the start of the war and the front more or less stabilised after a few months, the war's destructive impact was concentrated in a relatively small area. I will come back in the last section to the long-term consequences of this destruction for the capital stock and economic growth. But in the short term the economic impact on the war effort was high, since all the ten départements (out of a total of 87) that were occupied stopped producing for (and paying taxes to) France. This is not taken into account in Villa's statistics, which consider the entire (postwar) territory except, naturally, for taxes and all government activities. For these state activities, statistics necessarily consider the territory under government control, so that the invaded regions count as zero. 4 This approach is fine when one wants to measure the long-term consequences of the war. But one cannot directly use these data to evaluate the contribution of 'French' production during the war to the war effort. This is not a mere detail. The ratio of taxes to GDP, for example, compares taxes raised in the government-controlled region alone with the GDP of the entire French national territory, and hence understates the burden of taxes on the government-controlled region. The problem is complicated still further by the fact that a number of refugees from the occupied territories moved to France during the war, modifying the relative productive capacities of the two regions.
5 Table 6 .2 gives the relative sizes of these different regions. It suggests that a rough estimate of the difference between governmentcontrolled and total GDP is between 13 and 20 per cent of total GDP.
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In any case, one must add to the decrease in production a further decrease in taxable income, and the need for the French-controlled territory to replace the products from invaded regions as consumption or intermediary goods. On that account, the invasion's immediate consequences for France were enormous, since the invaded region was among the richest: it had a highly productive agriculture (20 per cent of 1913 wheat production, 25 per cent of oats, 12 per cent of potatoes, 50 per cent of sugar beets); but most of the steel (80 per cent) and electricity (43 per cent) production, coal (55 per cent) and iron ore (90 per cent), mines, metallurgy, woollen and linen textiles were either under German control or no longer functioning. So even if production did not stop, the invasion led, for example, to a shortage of coal and iron ore (and more generally of most primary products), which was a major reason for the decrease of industrial production in non-invaded France. Actually, some contemporaries consider that this was as important a shortage as the lack of manpower. Imports rose dramatically, and more than a quarter of the iron consumption was imported in 1916-18, as well as one-third of the coal consumption.
One must then take into account these shocks when trying to explain the evolution of production and investment: part of the investment and production in non-occupied France resulted from the need to replace the production from the occupied zone. The opposite was also true, but firms in occupied France faced a worse situation, even neglecting destruction, confiscation and relationships with the occupants: the territory had little autonomy and homogeneity, it had no access to the French capital market (and seemingly also to the German capital market), labour was even scarcer than in the rest of France, and the transportation network was inadequate. 7 The economy of the occupied zone therefore certainly suffered much more than that of the rest of the territory, something existing statistics may well undervalue.
Mobilisation as a labour demand shock
The mobilisation was a major labour demand shock. The first mobilisation in August 1914 took 2.9 million men out of a male working population of 12.6 million. Within 10 months, 2.7 million followed, bringing the army to . This shock dramatically affected civilian economic activities, which were crowded out of the labour market for young men. This was partly compensated for by an intensification of the work of the remaining men, women, and children. In particular, many industries that had remained entirely reserved for men were opened to women (metallurgy, armaments, etc.). Unsurprisingly, unemployment almost disappeared.
In the short term, the departure of the mobilised workers profoundly disrupted production, and many voices asked for the exemption of 'essential' workers from the army or other solutions. Augé-Laribé (1925) showed in the case of agriculture that all efforts to compensate for the departure of farm workers were small in comparison to the costs of mobilisation: soldiers were given some special permissions for the seedtime or the harvest, but they were negligible in comparison with the needs. For example, in 1916 they represented only 6.5 million man-days (2 per worker!) and 75,000 horse-days. Efforts were made to stimulate immigration from Spain or Portugal, but this too was very insufficient, representing less than 150,000 persons from 1915 to 1918, including women and children. This was less than the loss resulting from the fact that Italian immigrants who used to come before the war were no longer allowed to travel to France.
Even the armament industry's labour needs were little considered at the beginning of the war. Only 11,000 workers were exempted from mobilisation, almost all of them (7,600) in the public-owned arsenals, when private armaments firms employed 50,000 workers. Mobilised workers were assigned to civil activities in the civil service or on the railways before manufacturing industries, where the labour force initially decreased sharply even in metallurgy ( À67 per cent in August 1914) or the chemical industries ( À58 per cent). The mean employment reduction for manufacturing was À66 per cent.
Quite rapidly, nevertheless, the government allowed half a million workers to go back to the armament factories, and to some civilian industries which were given a high priority. By July 1915, metallurgy had 82 per cent of its prewar labour force and the chemical industries 66 per cent by January 1916 they had respectively attained 100 per cent and 93 per cent. In August 1917, 518,000 soldiers were assigned to armament factories and 300,000 to farms, some 15 per cent of the total armed forces of 5.2 million men, in spite of constant pressure from the military to keep soldiers at the front (table 6.3). The progressive increase in the assignment of military manpower to production then reflected the rising importance of the economy in the war.
Outside the armament industries, the shock to the labour force was enormous. It implied not only a reduction in the labour force but a reallocation among industries. Table 6 .4 gives the changes in the number of wage earners by sector, on a 1913 basis. Except for agricultural workers (for which most 'wage earners' were probably the wives of individual farmers, which explains the stability of their number), all manufacturing industries faced a reduction of at least 20 per cent of their labour force in 1915, the worst year of the war for most activities. Even the 'investment goods' sector, which included armament production, dropped by 33 per cent in 1914, before recovering slowly in 1915 and very rapidly thereafter. In transportation, a military priority, numbers employed were maintained, even at the start of the war. By contrast, construction workers almost disappeared, at least employed ones. Unfortunately, almost no data are available on independent labour, a very significant part (around 40 per cent) of the labour force with 8.35 million people in 1913 (including 4.72 in agriculture). I discuss this below.
Government finance as a capital demand shock
The war not only mobilised men, but also required capital on an unprecedented scale. Direct use of existing capital was not negligible, with the requisition of horses, then an essential part of the agricultural capital stock, being costly for agricultural production. The priority given to military needs in access to the railways also upset a transportation system which relied heavily on railways. (1997) . Numbers of independent workers (thousands, column 10), available only from 1919 onwards, series EIU01 to 10 from Villa (1997) . For the total private sector labour force (EMPE series), see discussion on p. 000. In 1913, the overall labour force also included 969,000 government employees and 913,000 household employees not included in the private sector data above.
But, most importantly, financial resources were concentrated by the state for its own needs and the financial priorities it decided. I will look below at the government budget. Here, I will focus only on the impact of war on private investment, and first on the crowding-out of private firms' issues on the financial market. From the start of the war, no issue could be organised without an authorisation by the Ministère des Finances, and few were given. Table 6 .5 shows the evolution of private and government issues on the capital market. The almost exclusive reservation of the capital market for the government's needs is clear, not only during the war but also for the immediate postwar period, when consolidation of short-term debt was necessary (see below).
When one looks in more detail at the distribution of issues among sectors, using the incomplete data from the Crédit Lyonnais summarised in Marnata (1973) , one observes that the general decrease in issues was accentuated for such big prewar issuers as banks, transportation, and mining. In comparison, sectors such as iron and steel, metallurgy, the mechanical and chemical industries, were given priority access for obvious reasons. Electricity production and even textiles were also allowed to increase their share of a decreasing pie.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to compare these data directly with those of Villa for lack of equivalence between their nomenclatures, and then to evaluate the impact of restricted access to the capital market on private sector investment. Table 6 .6 gives the changes in respect of total building and material investment on a 1913 constant price basis, and their relative changes for the different sectors. In real terms, total investment decreased continuously during the war, from a mean of 6.3 billion 1913 francs a year in 1910-13 to a low of 4.2 billion in 1918. But in percentage of GDP terms, investment maintained its 1913 16 per cent level in 1914 and 1915, and only decreased to a 12 per cent level from 1916 on. Investment in buildings decreased much more sharply and more durably than investment in material. While material investment never exceeded a 30 per cent decrease relative to 1913, building investment almost reached a 50 per cent reduction (in 1918) and came back to its prewar level only in 1924 (compared with 1920 for material investment). This is consistent with change in production in the construction sector.
Building and material investments have in common the rapid increase in the share of the transportation sector, and the drop in that of the construction sector. The change in investment in transportation, the only sector with a rise in real investment during the war, matches that of the labour force in the sector. It results from its key military role, but also from the changes in the industrial geography of France imposed by the invasion. It is striking that it occurred in spite of the fall in the listed companies (for details, see Hautcoeur, 1994: 60ff.) . Railways and government issues are from Crédit Lyonnais (Marnata, 1973) . The bottom row gives the ratio of private issuses to the private investment figure given by Villa (1997, IE series) . Notes and sources: The first column shows nominal investment in 1913 (billion francs). Subsequent columns give the change in real investment from 1913 to 1920. Calculated from series IBZE and IMZE from Villa (1997) .
resources that could be obtained from its once privileged access to the capital market. A possible answer could be a direct financing by the government or (government-controlled) price increases on the railways (although this does not appear in the transportation sector's price series from Villa). One may be surprised to note that building investment decreased less in the consumption goods industry (including food industries) than in the investment goods sector which includes armaments. This suggests that the boom in armaments used mostly existing buildings, reconverting them from civilian use. A look at the material investment data for that sector shows that it indeed increased its share of investment, although by much less than would be suggested by the observed increase in production or even by the priority access that it obtained to the capital market. It thus appears that the rise in armaments production resulted more from a reorganisation of existing factories and materials than from a massive surge in investment.
As these few examples show, an explanation of the changes in investment would require more than the data available on a then much reduced capital market. Given the absorption of financial resources by the state, firms had to rely on their own saving capacity (retained earnings) even more than in peacetime. With no data available on profits, and insufficiently precise data on prices, wages, and production changes, we must be content with the few remarks above. Many questions remain open: do these data overvalue investment, which contemporary assertions on the exhaustion of existing capital would suggest? Do they undervalue it, as other contemporary claims on excess war profits would say? And if we accept these data as the best evaluation, to what extent did investment replace production capacities that existed in occupied regions before the war, preparing future overcapacities? To what extent was investment influenced by the disruptions in foreign trade that could also disappear with the end of the war? What levels of prices and profits were necessary as a compensation for these risks, or for investing in military production that could be adapted to civil use only with a cost? Answers to these questions would be necessary to evaluate the impact of wartime investment on postwar growth. But it is unlikely that the macroeconomic data we have will be sufficient to answer any of these questions. New research based on individual firms' balance sheets combined with stock market data, as in Grotard and Hautcoeur (2001) , will be necessary to go beyond this.
Demand and supply shocks in goods markets
The most important determinants of investment and the reallocation of labour were certainly the changes in the demand and supply of goods.
The first change resulted from the rise in public expenditure, whose the share in GDP increased massively: government consumption (excluding salaries and investment expenses) rose from 2.5 to 20 per cent of GDP from 1913 to 1916. Government demand oriented production towards war-related products. Nevertheless, the equipment and furnishing of the armies, from uniforms to food, did not imply a complete shift from civilian products, as shown, for example, by the resulting increase in tobacco consumption. More importantly, government consumption was probably not the only cause of changing consumption patterns: it is also likely that the civilian population's demand was modified by the war, not only because some products were no longer available, but also because of changes in household structures (now predominantly women-led) or in income. Nevertheless, in the absence of detailed studies on these subjects, the most visible fact was the enormous surge in demand for military production after the rapid exhaustion of existing stocks.
The second important shock affecting the goods markets was the break-up of trade relationships with Germany, Austria, Hungary, and soon Belgium and other invaded regions, which together represented around one-third of French imports and exports in 1913. The disappearance of this trade forced French importers and manufacturers to find new sources of supply, especially for manufactures. Imports increased sharply from 1915 to 1917, which also helped to compensate for the occupation of north-eastern France, and the decrease in French production of various goods. As table 6.7 shows, imports came mostly from the United States (whose share of imports more than tripled) and the UK (whose share doubled), even if smaller, mostly neutral, European countries like Switzerland or Spain also increased their exports sharply.
On the other hand, exports declined, reaching a low of one-third of their 1913 level in 1918. This resulted not only from the missing European markets and the difficulty of finding new markets in the war context, but also from the increased absorption of the French market and from the reallocation of production towards non-tradable or domestically demanded products. The real exchange rate also probably played a role in the divergence between exports and imports, since the real rise of the franc (resulting from a somewhat higher inflation and a relatively stable exchange rate) encouraged imports and discouraged exports. This role remained nevertheless apparently limited since the appreciation of the franc was substantial only in 1918, the very year the trade deficit decreased. Then the logic of the trade deficit can probably be viewed as one of inter-temporal smoothing of consumption and investment, although more detailed studies specifying the relative weights of all these causes would be welcomed. Notes and sources: Imports and exports (by value and volume) are for commerce spécial (excluding re-exports). Country rows show shares of each country in French imports and exports by value. All data from Villa (1997) and our calculations.
One important question is the extent and the impact of government intervention in the adaptation of the economy to these shocks, especially to the transformation of production and the capacity of the private sector to adapt and satisfy the military needs. The literature describes many examples of small interventions which ended up facilitating market solutions more than preventing them. For example, as early as September 1914, the government convened an assembly of manufacturers, asking them to reach a production of 100,000 shells per day for the 75 field gun. It proposed government financing, even for new factories to be built, and then helped the target to be reached in the summer of 1915. But if shells were produced by private industry, this was not the case for powder and most arms, which were produced by the arsenals, under direct government control. In a later section I will also examine the extent of government direct involvement in foreign trade as well as in production, and the extent to which I will also the private sector was allowed and was able to adapt. Before that, I turn in the next section to the macroeconomic management of the economy (to use a quite anachronistic expression), which mainly consisted of financing the budget and the trade deficits.
Macroeconomic policy

War finance
The war implied a massive budgetary effort. Public spending increased suddenly from 10 to 50 per cent of GDP (table 6.8), most of it in the form of military spending: soldiers' pay, army provisioning (food, armaments, and ammunitions, etc). Government consumption rose from 2-3 per cent before the war to a maximum of 22 per cent in 1916, when government investment decreased. In the short term, the conviction that the war would be short-lived led to an increase in short-term borrowing through Bons du Trésor (relabelled Bons de la Défense Nationale), and Banque de France credit (avances). When the war lasted longer than expected, long-term loans were issued each year from 1915 to 1918 to raise funds and consolidate the short-term debt, which nevertheless continued to rise.
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The government benefited from two important institutional assets developed during the nineteenth century. First, there was a welldeveloped capital market, especially for long-term securities; in 1913, the capitalisation of French securities on the Paris official market represented around 140 per cent of GDP, attaining 280 per cent including foreign securities, and securities issued amounted to around 10 per cent of GDP every year before the war. Second, there was a high degree of confidence in the government, as demonstrated by the permanently low yield on the (Mouré, 2002: 42) . We discuss the series in more detail in Bordo and Hautcoeur (2003) .
state rentes, one of the lowest in the world. This confidence in government was also demonstrated by the confidence in the value of the franc and in the Banque de France, whose notes represented a high proportion of the money stock during the nineteenth century and did not suffer any loss in credibility, even during the Franco-Prussian War. These strengths allowed the reopening of the Bourse shortly after the beginning of the War, and the issuance of enormous quantities of government bonds at relatively low interest rates.
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These strengths resulted partly from the political and social stability of France, which was more durable than in some of the other great powers: a parliamentary democracy with universal male suffrage, organised political parties all participating openly in political debate and power, organised labour (independent of political parties); and even the revolutionary and internationalist socialist faction did not oppose war, despite the assassination of its leader Jean Jaurès a few days before the war. In sum, political stability, monetary credibility, and a well-organised financial system allowed indebtedness to rise a great deal without much inconvenience.
State indebtedness rapidly reached a very high level (124 per cent of GDP as early as 1916), partly because it was already high (65 per cent) before the war. Even considering the normal smoothing of wartime expenses, an increase in ordinary government resources rapidly appeared necessary. Taxes nevertheless stagnated until the end of the war (table 6.8).
Discussions of an increase in taxation began rapidly when the size of the deficit, almost 40 per cent of GDP each year, became clear. But there was enormous opposition to the idea of adding taxes to the 'blood tax', and the recent political conflicts on the income tax (voted in 1913) were on everybody's mind. Even the application of income tax during the war was resisted; it began only in 1916, at very low rates, and raised less than 1 billion francs during the war. The only new tax was on extraordinary war profits, voted for in 1916 with very high rates, which began to produce significant revenues only after the war. This was because of the difficulties of organising a new tax administration on an income that was badly measured, as a result of not having been taxed before, and so income tax remained mostly a political symbol during the war (Grotard and Hautcoeur, 2001 ). Furthermore, income from older taxes frequently decreased because of the drop in GDP, the invasion of part of the territory, and sometimes the inadequacies of the assessment methods in an inflationary context. The few small increases in their rates were not a sufficient solution to the deficit.
Another solution was monetary financing. Recourse to direct credit or avances by the Banque de France to the state provided low-cost income (table 6.9) and decreased the demand on the money and financial markets, maintaining low interest rates (table 6.10), and then relatively low government interest payments (table 6.8). This was possible temporarily because liquidity held by the public increased, especially in the later part of the war (table 6.11). But, in the medium run, banks started to discount at the Banque de France the Treasury bonds they held, which accelerated the growth of the money base and the inflationary process (table 6.10). In 1916 and 1917, some flight from the currency began. As a result of increasing prices, M2 and M3 dropped back to their prewar levels as a proportion of GDP (table 6.11), market long-term interest rates rose, although slowly, and deposits in savings and loans began to decrease in nominal terms in spite of a rise in their (state-guaranteed) return.
The government tried to slow the inflationary process by direct intervention in the economy through price controls, but evasion was widespread, and since monetary financing increased, inflation accelerated. Monetary resources became of practical importance for the government, especially if one adds the inflation tax onto the debt. An evaluation of monetary resources as the sum of the increase in Banque de France avances plus the product of the public debt multiplied by the difference between the inflation rate and the nominal yields on the 3 per cent rentes gives rather impressive amounts (table 6.12).
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The reason for such a high inflation tax is that contemporaries did not adjust their inflation expectations sufficiently. Until the end of the war, they widely believed that the franc would be restored to its prewar gold parity and prices would come back to their prewar level. Comparing financial markets' yields with those abroad, one observes that, at most, a 50 per cent depreciation of the franc was the expected price of the war, after which stabilisation was expected. One may even consider that higher long-term rates were more a reflection of expectations of taxes on capital income (which would actually materialise) than of monetary depreciation.
11 Furthermore, since interest rates in the United States had not increased substantially in spite of a 70 per cent rise in prices during the war, even a return to prewar gold parity was compatible with a substantial inflation tax if remaining gold standard countries did not impose a general price decrease. Because they had forgotten the lessons from the assignats, the rentiers paid a large share of the war's price.
Macroeconomic adjustment
More profoundly, an important question for the macroeconomic understanding of the war concerns the behaviour of the main components of global expenditures. Table 6 .13 shows the main tendencies. As a result of Notes and sources: All amounts in billion francs. All from Villa (1997) .
war, government consumption increased sharply. Nevertheless, this was not the only factor responsible for the decrease in household consumption and in investment. Actually, the increase in the trade deficit almost exactly matched the increase in government consumption until 1915, exceeded it slightly in 1916 and 1918, and by a wider margin in 1917 (some 10 per cent of French GDP that year), something explained above as inter-temporal smoothing of both consumption and investment. Thus the decrease in private consumption and investment resulted mostly from the drop in real GDP. It seems that, at the start of the war, the belief that it would be short-lived led households and firms not to reduce their expenditure.The increase in government expenditure then resulted in a trade deficit. But the decrease in GDP in 1915 led to a sharp reduction in households' income and consumption (especially since they did not reduce their investment), even if their shares in GDP did not vary much. From 1916 on, it is more difficult to discern a clear story, because the data appear to suffer a consistency problem. The accounting equality between resources (imports þ GDP) and theiruses (exports þ investment þ consumption) that is used to construct table 6.13, does not hold, as the size of the error term shows. Unless there was an enormous surge in stocks, we face either an overvaluation of GDP or an undervaluation of some demands, or both. This error, which represents almost 14 per cent of GDP in 1916 and 20 per cent in 1917, makes it impossible to understand the macroeconomics of the second half (1997) .
of the war and to evaluate the extent of the smoothing of consumption and investment.
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One issue which can nevertheless be examined is the role of the trade balance. As already mentioned, the rapid increase in the deficit in both 1916 and 1917 not only more than compensated for the rise in government consumption, but compensated for the decrease in GDP (M þ GDP was superior in 1916 and 1917 to its prewar level, with exports being much lower). Thus the French only had to 'pay' immediately for part of the increase in government consumption, an amount representing some 12 per cent of available resources (GDP þ M).
Financing the trade deficit
How was France able to finance such an upsurge in the trade deficit, especially when traditional compensating resources such as tourism also declined? 13 The task of financing the deficit was mostly managed by the government, in a sharp break with previous free trade and gold standard experience. The first choice was to manage the exchange rate. Convertibility was suspended on 5 August 1914, which allowed the Banque de France to bring back its discount rate to a permanent 5 per cent (a relatively high level, but below what would have been needed to preserve convertibility). But the franc did not float freely. Intervention by the Treasury and the Banque de France controlled its depreciation to less than 20 per cent; between August 1914 and July 1915, the franc fell progressively from 5.2 to 6 francs per dollar. The franc/dollar exchange rate remained below 6 until the end of the war, being pegged successively at 5.83 from July 1916, 5.7 from the US entry into the war, and even 5.45 in the last quarter of 1918. The purpose of this management was twofold.
14 First, the government wanted imports to remain cheap, mostly for budgetary reasons. 15 Second, and most importantly, it could not accept the economic and political risk of sharp fluctuations of the exchange rate. An ordered exchange market was a political objective, since it testified to the strength and solidarity of the Allies against the German pressure.
The financing of the balance of payments was also consistent with that objective. Since the government managed the exchange rate, it had to provide the foreign currencies required, thus leaving little room for market adjustment by private loans or through the securities markets. Blancheton (2001: 108ff.) describes how this was done. The government bought back foreign securities held by residents (a conservative estimate suggests that they amounted in 1913 to around 100 per cent of French GDP, which would have been sufficient for the entire war deficit if all of it had been bought and could be sold at its prewar value). 16 The government borrowed gold from the Banque de France to do this. 17 Then it sold the foreign securities or gave them as guarantees for loans issued abroad. The first French Treasury bonds in sterling were sold as early as October 1914 and the Treasury borrowed from New York banks starting in November 1914.
But the most important move was the agreement signed on 30 April 1915 by Lloyd George and Ribot (then Président du Conseil) for a £60 million loan. This organised the principle of the financial solidarity between the United Kingdom and France, which had recently been mentioned by Lloyd George in the House of Commons on 15 February. Joint loans by France and the United Kingdom on the American market followed. At the end of the war, French debts to the United Kingdom reached $3 billion and to the United States almost $4 billion. All these amounts plus $1 billion in gold were used by the Treasury to provide foreign currencies for French importers (through the banks) and then to stabilise the exchange rate.
18 One important point is that no speculation appeared on the exchange market until mid-1917, which allowed the scheme to work quite smoothly and without exchange control, and suggests that the exchange rate was not far from equilibrium as considered by the markets.
The state and adaptation
We observed above that the impact of the state's actions on the economy increased enormously during the war because of the rise in government expenditure and related demands on the labour and capital markets. With a budget representing around half of GDP, the state seems to have been as present as it is today in the economy, and maybe more so, because of the legitimacy that the war gave to its intervention. On the other hand, liberal economic thinking dominated and nobody thought the state had the administrative capacity to organise production directly. The state actually controlled little production directly, and let the private sector work whenever possible. Nevertheless, the legitimacy of direct intervention grew, and some new mechanisms were developed. I will show that their use was limited by the relatively good adaptation of the private sector to the war shock, and that most 'normal' economic mechanisms continued to work.
State intervention: instruments and ideas
Let us distinguish between the actual development of instruments for a more centrally planned economy and the development of an ideology insisting on co-operation and organisation as substitutes for the liberal credo. Albert Thomas, a socialist, had an important role in the former, establishing a new specialised sub-department for artillery and ammunition in May 1915. In December 1916 this was transformed into a full Ministry of Armaments, which co-ordinated all the state's productive activities directed to the war. Thomas's particular objective was to exchange the willing participation of workers in the war effort for social measures, especially compulsory arbitration (in 1917) and a minimum wage in war-dedicated factories.
But even if he intervened directly in the functioning of some markets, Thomas was more interested in co-ordination than in étatisation or even German or US-style cartelisation. And this policy was given a more liberal orientation when Thomas was succeeded in September 1917 by Loucheur, who nevertheless did not modify the overall organisation that had been set up. Actually, the most important change was that all social questions were transferred to the Ministry of Labour whereas Thomas had maintained an intimate relationship between social and industrial policies.
In order to maximise manufacturing (mostly armaments) production, Thomas organised private firms in groups, with which the government discussed products and prices. For example, there were fifteen groups for the production of shells, in which 375 firms were interested. This simplified the task of the administration, without subordinating it to privately organised cartels, which the famous Comité des Forges had proposed to develop. Although manufacturers frequently asked the state to guarantee that it would buy all their production, this guarantee was never given, and the state imposed reorientation of production against their initial wishes. True, this co-ordination led in many cases to an increase in the power of (relatively weak) prewar cartels, profits were high and considered justified. Hardach (1977a and 1977b) nevertheless concludes that in France there was no such a fusion of cartels and the state administration as there was in Germany and the United States during the war.
This action by Thomas was reinforced by that of Clémentel, Minister of Commerce, who considered that the French economy was weakened by its insufficient cartelisation (in comparison with Germany and the United States), and that the state should create incentives for a better organisation of French capitalism which would help it to become more dynamic and growth-oriented, especially towards foreign markets (Kuisel, 1981) . That central idea was shared by Henri Hauser, who, for example, proposed a reorganisation of the chambers of commerce into a smaller number of units that would be more efficient at mobilising their efforts. But all these ideas remained mostly in the rhetorical sphere, and did not lead to many state interventions during the war.
For example, direct state intervention remained limited, in spite of a permanent rhetoric, especially at the Chambre des Députés, of 'industrial mobilisation', 'factory requisition'. Thomas never tried to have direct authority over the war industry, but created some minimal protection for the mobilised workers assigned to armament factories who, like soldiers at the front, had no normal workers' rights such as the right to go on strike or to join a union, something which had led some manufacturers to reduce their wages or increase their work load. Even this was not sufficient to avoid an increase in strikes (by 'free' workers) in 1917, which involved some 300,000 workers in the armaments industry alone.
The state intervened more directly in foreign trade, but this came quite late. It was not until March 1917 that imports required government authorisation and the commercial fleet was requisitioned. The exchange control was created progressively from August 1917 on.
19 These decisions led to enormous protests by manufacturers, but they had to be accepted in the face of the emergency situation, the insistence of the Allies who were financing ever-increasing French imports, and the political necessity of limiting excessive profits. They were successful at least in decreasing (sharply) imports in 1918, at an unknown economic, social, and military cost. The administration that was created in order to maximise the efficiency of remaining imports, in which manufacturers had an important representation, worked quite smoothly. Nevertheless, such an intrusion of the state into the daily functioning of the economy was never accepted and never reached the gigantic proportions of what existed for a long time in Germany. Even if it was maintained until 1926, the exchange control never really worked, and import rationing disappeared rapidly after the war.
The flexibility of the private sector: two tests A test of the force of market mechanisms is whether production followed demand without an enormous adaptation cost. Since the allocation of the labour force among sectors was little controlled by the government and changes in production are relatively well known (and, unsurprisingly, mirror those in the labour force allocation, see tables 6.1 and 6.4), an important question is whether these changes came at a large or small cost. One key test of the flexibility of the economy is the change in labour productivity.
What does theory suggest? A big rise in the number of government 'employees' during the mobilisation meant a reduction in the quantity of labour available for private economic activity. If everything else was equal and the capital stock was stable, this should imply a rise in average productivity and real wages. In fact, many other things were not equal. First, the army took the most vigorous and frequently the most qualified workers, especially from the fields and the factories, which may have decreased productivity and then the demand for labour. Second, disruption to the economy increased costs, with a negative impact on labour demand. Third, the shifts in demand imposed a reorganisation of many sectors, leading to price reductions and losses in some industries, and then wage cuts even when the level of productivity had been maintained. Fourth, the migration of refugees from the occupied regions to the rest of France was not homogeneously distributed, benefiting mostly cities like Lyon or Bordeaux and imposing other adaptation costs. Finally, the stock of capital and the flow of investment were affected. In the face of these negative shocks, one may consider that a small decrease in productivity would be a sign of a good adaptive capacity of the private sector, while a substantial drop would suggest that it could not resist these shocks.
Given the difficulties with the measure of the capital stock, I concentrate here on labour productivity. The first problem is that the production data include the production of independent workers whose distribution among sectors is unknown. Hence I could not calculate labour productivity indices, except for the private economy as a whole and for those sectors where independent work was negligible. This was the case in the energy, intermediate, and investment goods sectors, where in 1919, the first year for which these data are available, independent workers represented less than 20 per cent of employees, in sharp contrast with most other sectors.
The first rows of table 6.14 show the change in labour productivity in these three sectors, calculated using Villa's data. They suggests a sharp decrease in productivity for the private economy as a whole, with extreme Table 6 .14. France: productivity in various sectors and the private economy (1913 ¼ 1) 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 Energy 1 Notes and sources: Mean labour productivity for the private economy as a whole is PRODE from Villa (1997) .
cases like the intermediate goods sector, where the initially high level of productivity would not be regained before the middle of the 1920s. The revised evaluation uses our revised estimate of the total labour force in the private economy (table 6.15). Productivity in the three sectors is calculated using each sector's production and dividing it by an estimate of the sectoral labour force. This estimate adds to the employees of each sector (Villa's NSU series) the same proportion for independent workers as they had in 1919, 0.9 per cent and 19 per cent respectively of the number of employees for the energy, intermediate, and investment goods sectors. The revised series for the investment goods sector results from adding to that revised labour force 500,000 (mobilised) workers for each of the years 1915-17.
One must nevertheless discuss the data before accepting these conclusions. Two surprising features of Villa's data are, first, that the total labour force of the private sector is little affected by the war, in contrast to the number of wage earners, and, second, that no data on government workers are given, as if they were included in the private sector. If one evaluates the number of state workers from the data on wages paid by the government, and the number of independent workers in the private sector by supposing they were affected by mobilisation in a similar proportion to salaried workers (table 6.15), one finds numbers that are consistent with the size of the army (around 5 million men) and a significant elasticity of the labour force. The total labour force increases from 18.4 to 20.8 million, which represents an important rise in the participation rate if one considers the death-toll from the war.
This new estimate of the total private sector labour force gives a very different view of the change in productivity, which remained stable at the beginning of the war and decreased at the end. Such a change, because it implies that the decrease in production resulted only from the decrease in the labour force but not from a disruption of the economy, is consistent with the hypothesis of some underemployment in the economy before the war, which came back when it ended. Nevertheless, it is likely that some disruption did exist, and that some reduction in productivity occurred before 1917, which my rough estimate hides, but which seems more natural than a sudden decrease in 1917. The cases of the energy and intermediary goods sectors are consistent with that.
The investment (mainly military) goods industry provides an example of spectacular productivity improvement. This underlay the satisfaction in the Rapport Clémentel (Ministère du Commerce, 1919) , which explained that the war had given opportunities to introduce Taylorism to France and so raise productivity. part of the increase claimed, however, is probably a statistical artefact resulting from the exclusion of the mobilised workers mentioned above from measured employment. Taking Notes and sources: Employees in the private sector is NSE from Villa (1997) ; independent workers starts from EIE 1913 data from Villa and assumes for the war years a similar evolution each year (in relative terms) as for employees. Total labour force in the private sector is EMPE from Villa. Our revision is the sum of employees and independent workers as described in the text. State workers are estimated from the total wages paid by the state (MSG from Villa), assuming that the mean wage in the public sector changes from 1913 onwards at the same pace as the mean wage in the economy (WH from Villa). Revised total labour force is the sum of private and public sector labour forces from our estimates.
them into account, as the notes to the table explain, gives a lower, more plausible estimate of the increase in productivity. As surprising as it may appear, the productivity test suggests that the economy adapted with relatively little cost to all the disruptions imposed by the war, so that the main impact of the war on production was through the reduction in the quantity of labour available. The effects of the various disruptions mentioned may have compensated each other, but the most likely explanation is that a flexible economy was able to adapt rapidly to these shocks, with little impact on overall labour productivity. The case of the armaments industry is no exception, since it benefited from special treatment by the government because of its key role in fighting the war.
Another test of the flexibility of the economy in the face of supply and demand shocks is the change in relative prices and wages among sectors. A rise in prices, especially if it was not accompanied by a reduction in productivity, would signal a constraint on demand. It could lead to high profits and wage increases. On the other hand, a decrease in prices without an increase in productivity could be the result of a diversion of demand from its peacetime allocation, leading to losses and eventually to failures, even if the expectation of the 'return to normality' made it difficult for firms to abandon their assets.
Unfortunately, no data are available on relative wages before the end of the war (1920) . I can thus only compare the change in production and prices among sectors during the war. In a normal market, an increase in production requires a rise in labour and capital inputs, and leads to price increases only if marginal productivity decreases. If I suppose that productivity was not much affected, I can use the difference between the change in production and prices as a test of the flexibility of the economy.
Agricultural production never decreased by much more than 20 per cent. Prices too remained fairly stable, decreasing slightly in relative terms, which suggests that the quantity of food available remained sufficient during the war, probably thanks to imports. The drop in the production of the food processing industries was sharper, but prices did not move much, suggesting demand also decreased. The dramatic increase in armaments production was not reflected in rising prices, which goes against the contemporary rumours of enormous war profits. Nevertheless, the investment goods sector is broader than the armaments industry, and the prices of contracts between the government and armaments producers may have remained outside price indices, so that this claim needs to be verified. Energy production, mostly coal production, was greatly affected by the start of the war, and prices rose, suggesting demand was quite inelastic. Prices decreased thereafter, probably thanks to rapidly expanding imports.
The prices which rose most were those of construction, intermediate goods and, increasingly, consumption goods. It is no coincidence that these sectors experienced the sharpest and most durable reductions in production (a reduction which reached 80 per cent for construction in 1918 compared to 1913, 65 per cent for intermediate goods, and more than 50 per cent for consumption goods). In these three cases, it seems that the constraint on supply produced by the mobilisation was not followed by a similar reduction in demand. In the case of intermediate goods, it seems reasonable to observe a rise in prices when the output of the sector decreased significantly in comparison with that of other sectors which were its clients. For construction and consumption goods, one may think that the macroeconomic conditions were not without responsibility for this situation. Even if price controls were set up, an expansionary monetary policy (see below) led the population to seek refuge in real estate or in increased consumption. The control of rents (which decreased continuously relative to other prices until the mid-1920s) was intended to limit speculation in real estate. But it made more income available for consumption.
What we observe in 1920 (table 6.16) on wages confirms these observations. Wages increased more rapidly in the consumption goods, construction, and intermediate goods sectors, reflecting price increases that resulted from penury and not from increased costs. Agriculture, where relative wages increased significantly, is no exception, even if prices seemed to decline. Price control was widespread but the black market Notes and sources: The change in index numbers of wages, production, and prices in each sector, based on 1913 ¼ 1, relative to change across the whole economy. Calculated from Villa (1997) .
developed widely, making the peasants who did not go to the front notoriously rich. On the other hand, transportation production increased, but price control led to increasing losses and relative wages decreased. One may tentatively conclude that market mechanisms still worked during the war, even if government interventions on demand, the allocation of labour, and prices made these mechanisms less efficient. Much more detailed study of prices and wages at the local and industry level is nevertheless needed to confirm this provisional conclusion.
Conclusion: the war and postwar growth
The cost of the war Sauvy (1984) gives figures for the aggregate cost of the war. Human losses relative to population are among the most important in all participating countries. In France, 1.31 million men were killed, and 1.1 million were severely wounded with permanent work incapacity. The existence of 600,000 widows and 750,000 orphans created enormous pension costs (2-3 per cent of GDP during most of the interwar period), the legitimacy of which was sometimes questioned (as in the case of the 900,000 parents that also benefited from pensions). If one adds excess mortality during the war, together with the low birth rate, the total impact on the population was around 2.95 million, or 7.2 per cent of the population, with increased maladjustment between the sexes and ages. This increased the proportion of the active to the inactive population, not an asset for postwar growth.
Material destruction resulting from the war was more important in France than in any country except Russia: Michel (1932) counts, for example, 222,000 houses destroyed, 3 million hectares, half the roads, 1,800 kilometres of canals, and 5,600 kilometres of railways needing reparation or reconstruction. Villa evaluates the impact of war damages on private productive capital at a quite low 1.6 billion 1913 francs in buildings (4 per cent of the capital stock) and 1.2 for other material (7 per cent of the total). By comparison, the Reparation Commission evaluated destruction by the Germans at 34 billion 1913 francs, including 6.8 billion for manufacturing and mining, 8.8 billion for agriculture, and 7.2 billion for real estate. Sauvy (1984) proposes to add 10 billion for capital depreciation in excess of the normal rate, and 20 billion for the decrease in French foreign assets, and suggests a global cost of 55 billion, or 125 per cent of the 1913 national income.
Labour
There is a surprising discrepancy between the qualitative account of the effects of war and some quantitative data. Qualitatively, one usually considers that the war increased the homogeneity of the country by helping peasants in remote areas to discover the rest of the country, and sometimes to discover new consumption, new techniques, new ways of life. More directly, the war is supposed to have helped to decrease the share of the rural population and the agricultural labour force, increase the participation of women in the labour force, and increase the importance of large relative to small firms.
If few measures of the geographic homogeneity of France have been made in order to test the first set of hypotheses, global quantitative data do not confirm the other hypotheses. First, it seems that the war had little effect on the choice between independent and employed status, either in agriculture or in other sectors. The number of independent workers even rose slightly from 8.35 million in 1913 (including 4.72 million in agriculture) to 8.58 million in 1919 (4.98 million in agriculture); and the proportion remained stable. The same is true for the relative sizes of agriculture, manufacturing, and services. The impact of the war on women's work also seems quantitatively unimportant. The number of women in the labour force rose from 7.2 to 7.4 million from 1913 to 1919, but since the number of men was also rising slightly, the proportion of women remained constant at 36 per cent. Continuity then dominates in the facts, even if mentalities may have changed more.
Capital
The capital market was persistently affected by the financing of the war. Inflation was required to reduce the size of the public debt (Bordo and Hautcoeur, 2003) , but it also affected the private capital market. All security holders were severely affected, which, combined with severe tax increases, resulted in an important decrease in wealth and income inequality (Piketty, 2001) . Nevertheless, in the second half of the 1920s, private issues had regained and surpassed their prewar level, and the securities market was more buoyant than ever. Securities were favoured by the maintenance of the rent controls created during the war, which crowded out investment in real estate.
If the private capital market was dynamic, the banks were more profoundly affected, as suggested by the decrease in the real value of their deposits. One reason was the creation or development of public financial institutions that had a major role in financing the economy after the war.
The Crédit National was created in order to finance the reconstruction by issuing loans and providing credit, and both the Crédit Agricole and the Caisse des Dépô ts et Consignations benefited from the war (Aglan et al., 2003) . They may have pioneered a more centralised allocation of financial resources, intermediate between the wartime authoritarian (but limited in scope) process and earlier market mechanisms.
France's international position
All these changes were important but, as discussed earlier, the French economy apparently adapted quite well to the war, and the same looks true for the 1920s, a period during which French growth was quite rapid in comparison with its neighbours, much to the surprise of those impressed by the atmosphere of budgetary or monetary crisis which dominated until 1926. Was the growth of the 1920s artificial, helped by an inflation tax on the unproductive rentiers, an undervaluation of the franc, and the refusal to pay for the war debts? Probably not to a very large extent, since the growth had sound technological and manufacturing foundations, and long-term interest rates in 1929 did not incorporate an inflation premium Hautcoeur and Sicsic (1999) . Also, some currency undervaluation was probably necessary, and would have disappeared within a few years. 20 Hence the most important negative legacy of the war was not strictly economic. This was the difficulty France had to find a new position in the world, at both the economic and political levels. Before 1914, France had a central financial and political position in continental Europe and the Mediterranean, which balanced the industrial position of Germany and complemented the mostly intercontinental position of Britain. Its instruments were diplomacy and loans to Spain, Italy, Russia, Austria, the Ottoman Empire, Egypt, etc. The war disrupted this order and France, like other major countries, hesitated between reconstructing a new global system from scratch and a more autarchyoriented, state-organised economy for which many thought, erroneously for a large part, the war had given an efficient example (James, 2000) . Partly because of that hesitation, no solution was found. Autarchy was costly and unacceptable for business, and the French, British, and German ambitions were every day in conflict over the new international order, as the example of the reconstruction and collapse of the international monetary and financial system shows. It led directly to the Great Depression and a second world war. exports, and income from assets held abroad. During the war, most of these resources also declined, the only compensation being the wages of (mostly British) foreign soldiers waging the war in France (one estimate proposes 9 billion francs on that account for the entire war). Unlike in prewar France, the balance of payments deficit was then similar to the trade deficit during the war. 14 As surprising as it appears, the management was organised on a bilateral basis for each currency traded in Paris (Blancheton, 2001: 115-26) . 15 This reason is not compelling since the real exchange rate did not move that much before 1918; and it substituted foreign to domestic debt, a dangerous move even if one consistent with an inter-temporal smoothing of the cost of the war. 16 As is well known, a large number of French assets was tied up in Russian, Austrian, and Ottoman debts, the value of which was destroyed by the war. Securities bought by the Treasury represented around 9 billion francs. 17 At the same time the Banque de France asked the French to sell their gold at the official prewar parity for national defence. It was able to obtain 2.4 billion francs in gold during the conflict, mostly during the first year. Even considering the 2 billion lost as guarantees of foreign loans, the Banque held more gold at the end of the war (5.5 billion francs) than at the beginning (5.0 billion). This was more than was required for monetary credibility. 18 Actually, these amounts certainly exceed the French balance of payments deficit for the war, since France also lent money to other Allies such as Italy and Russia. 19 Except for the 5 July 1914 prohibition on gold exports, the foreign exchange market had remained free during the war. A commission des changes created on 6 July 1917 under banker Octave Homberg helped to prepare the 2 August law, creating a compulsory registration of all exchange operations. A law of 3 April 1918 was more restrictive of capital exports but still accepted a number of derogations. 20 US protectionism and Germany's reluctance to pay the reparations made the restoration of the French external position difficult. As we argue in Bordo and Hautcoeur (2003) , the stabilisation of the franc would have been much more easily and satisfactorily done in a less conflicted context.
